Introduction
The Armenian Genocide can be approached from several angles (historical, memorial, political, sociological, statistical). It is also a geopolitical subject, whether through the study of the actors involved in carrying out the genocide of 1915 or through that of the instrumentalisation and denial of its memory a posteriori.
This work analyses the memory of the genocide through the prism of the power relations and contemporary rivalries that now shape its dynamics and uses. We take a multi-scalar approach, that is, an analysis of actors and power relations according to geographical scale:
- global: recognition of the Armenian Genocide around the world and the role of the diaspora;
- regional: the positions of the Armenian and Turkish states;
- local: the territories of the Armenian Genocide today.
The global scale
The internationalisation of the Armenian question was built over a long period, moving from diplomatic silence between the wars to a memorial offensive from the 1960s onwards. Today, recognition of the genocide can be seen as a marker of the strategic positioning of world powers towards Turkey, which denies the genocide, as does Azerbaijan. The memory of the genocide is threatened by instrumentalisation.
An example of instrumentalisation: recognition by Benjamin Netanyahu
In August 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recognised the Armenian Genocide,1 even though Israel is a strategic partner of Azerbaijan and had maintained cordial relations with Turkey since 1948. In the context of the war in Gaza since 2023, however, this recognition fits into a pattern of diplomatic tension with Turkey, which criticises Israeli policy and supports Hamas. It could thus amount to an instrumentalisation of Armenian memory to destabilise Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
The strategic role of the diaspora
The Armenian diaspora (between 7 and 10 million people according to estimates)2 plays a strategic role in preserving the culture and the memory of the genocide in its host countries, mainly Russia, the United States, France and Ukraine, as illustrated by the demonstrations held every 24 April. Above all, it carries out institutional influence work, through lobbying groups (the Armenian National Committee around the world, the CCAF in France) and parliamentary friendship groups that defend the Armenian cause.
Since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war (1988-1994), the diaspora has also pressed for recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, while getting involved on the humanitarian and political fronts after the defeat in the 44-day war in 2020, and then the takeover of the whole region in 2023 by Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, which caused ethnic cleansing and the flight of 120,000 Armenians.3 This territorial conflict is often seen as the continuation of a genocidal policy by Turkey and Azerbaijan towards Armenians.
The regional scale
The Armenian state: raison d’état under emergency
The Armenian state’s rhetoric since the 44-day war is now best understood through the paradigm of a raison d’état dictated by emergency. Today’s Republic of Armenia covers less than 10% of the historical territory of Armenian settlement.
Faced with persistent threats from Azerbaijan, Nikol Pashinyan advocates, in the name of normalisation, refocusing on the “Real Armenia”, breaking with the “Historical Armenia” that includes lands under Turkish and Azerbaijani sovereignty.
This shift in the name of state-centred pragmatism has been accompanied by notable institutional tensions, illustrated in March 2026 by the dismissal of Edita Gzoyan as director of the Genocide Museum, after a presentation to US Vice-President J. D. Vance was deemed provocative.4
This shift culminated in the message for the 111th commemoration, in which the Prime Minister used ambiguous wording: the genocide was presented as the result of “international machinations” that drew Armenians into a confrontation with the Ottoman Empire, thus paradoxically echoing the historical lines of Turkish denialism.5
Turkey: a perceived threat to national security
For Turkey, recognising the genocide of 1915 is not a historical question, but a perceived threat to its present-day national security. This position rests on several ideological pillars.
The Sèvres syndrome: the fear of dismemberment. According to the Turkish sociologist Fatma Müge Göçek,6 the term refers to the deep and widespread anxiety that foreign powers are seeking to dismantle Turkish territory by instrumentalising minorities. Any mention of 1915 is therefore interpreted as a prelude to territorial claims or demands for financial reparations.
The myth of the clean slate: founding denial. The Turkish Republic of 1923 was built on a culture of denial aimed at protecting the founding myth of the “clean slate”. This refusal to admit past crimes obscures the continuity between the Unionist cadres of 1915 and the new Kemalist elites. From this perspective, historians such as Raymond Kévorkian (Parachever un génocide, Odile Jacob)7 describe Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the man who completed the genocide, through his campaigns against the nascent Republic of Armenia between 1920 and 1922.
For Ankara, recognition is an existential risk: it would turn the “father of the nation” into a mass murderer, calling Turkish identity into question, and would reveal that national economic prosperity still rests today on the systematic plundering of Armenian property and capital.
The local scale
Iğdır: memorial inversion
The monument in Iğdır, a town on the border with Armenia, erected in 1999 supposedly to honour the victims of a “Turkish genocide”,8 embodies, beyond the denialism prevalent in Turkish society, a memorial inversion that legitimises denial by replacing soul-searching with slander.
This symbolic apparatus rests on strict judicial control, illustrated by the conviction of HDP (pro-Kurdish party) executives for “denigrating the nation”, over their call to recognise the genocide on 24 April 2021.9
This pressure forces even the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople into a semantic balancing act, preferring the notion of “shared suffering” to that of genocide in order to ensure its institutional survival under Ankara’s oversight.
Diyarbakır: a laboratory of reconciliation
In contrast to this monolithism, Diyarbakır, Dikranagerd in Armenian, has established itself as a laboratory of grassroots reconciliation. Despite the rupture of the 2016 expropriations,10 linked to the urban insurgency of 2015, the resilience of the Surp Giragos church and the awakening of “crypto-Armenians” through projects such as YERKIR bear witness to a reinvigorated sense of identity.
This memory finds expression in informal cultural diplomacy: initiatives such as the Van Project use ethnomusicology to connect the diaspora with local populations, bypassing state deadlocks through the reappropriation of a shared intangible heritage.
Faced with the immobility of a state frozen in its dogmas, these internal dynamics seem the most capable of transforming Turkish society from within. They echo the thinking of Hrant Dink:11 emancipation cannot come from outside arbitration, but from a maturing of national consciousness capable of dissolving, from the ground up, the system of fear that sustains denial.
Notes
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The Times of Israel, “In first, Netanyahu says he recognizes Armenian genocide”, August 2025; CivilNet, “Netanyahu falsely claims Israel’s parliament recognized Armenian genocide”. ↩
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Estimates range from 7 to 10 million. Migration Policy Institute, “Development through Diversity: Engaging Armenia’s New and Old Diaspora”. ↩
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Human Rights Watch, “Driven by Fear from Nagorno-Karabakh”, 17 October 2023. ↩
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OC Media, “Pashinyan confirms firing genocide memorial head for giving Vance book on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”; CivilNet, “Genocide scholars urge Armenia to reinstate museum director after resignation dispute”. ↩
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OC Media, “Pashinyan links Armenian Genocide to “international machinations” in commemorative address”, 24 April 2026; Armenpress, “Prime Minister Pashinyan’s statement on Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day”. ↩
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Fatma Müge Göçek, Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789-2009, Oxford University Press, 2015. ↩
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Raymond Kévorkian, Parachever un génocide. Mustafa Kemal et l’élimination des rescapés arméniens et grecs (1918-1922), Paris, Odile Jacob, 2023. See also Slate, “De Talaat Pacha à Mustafa Kemal, l’histoire du génocide arménien” (in French). ↩
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The Iğdır monument and museum was inaugurated on 5 October 1999. See “Iğdır Genocide Memorial and Museum”, Wikipedia. ↩
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Duvar English, “HDP politicians indicted over Armenian Genocide remark: “Against national interests”“; MLSA, “Ten former HDP executives sentenced to five months in prison each”. ↩
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Agos, ““Expropriation means closing down of Surp Giragos”“, 2016; The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, “Diyarbakir’s Surp Giragos Armenian Church Expropriated by Turkish Authorities”, 31 March 2016. ↩
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See in particular Hrant Dink, “The water finds its crack: an Armenian in Turkey”, openDemocracy, 2005. ↩
